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Williams: Williams: Consensual Approaches

Consensual Approaches to Resolving
Public Policy Disputes
I. INTRODUCTION
Those with knowledge of the present state of affairs at the local, state, and
federal governmental levels understand the difficulty often faced when government
officials attempt to implement controversial programs. Whether it be the
construction of a prison, the building of a municipal power plant, the establishment
of housing for low-income families, or the formulation of policy regarding the
disposal of hazardous waste, implementation of any of these programs will often be
met by intense opposition from many interested groups and individuals. Without
fail, many groups will attempt to block the government from moving forward on
controversial projects, regardless of how pressing the need for those projects may be.
Typically, the respective government officials will press on, realizing the importance
of the program to the local area or the nation as a whole. Often, those for and
against the controversial program or project will attempt to resolve their differences
through litigation.
At a theoretical level, one may surmise that the resolution of public policy
disputes should be accomplished through the judicial process. One may ask, who
is better equipped than the courts to handle disputes concerning such important
matters affecting so many individuals? If the court system can resolve civil disputes
between private individuals, one would imagine it should be used to resolve largescale conflicts between numerous individuals and interests.
While public policy disputes appear best suited for a judicial remedy, this is
often not the case in practice. A comparison of the typical public policy disputes
within the general private civil suit reveals the shortcomings of litigation as a tool
for resolving public conflict. The typical private civil suit will involve a small
number of parties, often fighting over a limited number of interests. The dispute will
often be viewed as a win-lose situation where one party wishes to take all to the
exclusion of the other-a zero-sum game. While proponents of Alternative Dispute
Resolution ("ADR") would contend that this dispute would be better resolved in a
forum outside the formal judicial system, one may concede that the present judicial
framework is best designed to resolve private disputes between two opposing
interests.'
Contrast the aforementioned private suit with the typical public dispute-for
example, the proposed construction of a landfill. Unlike many private suits, the
number of interested parties will be great. Residents in the proposed area of
construction and environmental activists may vehemently oppose the building of the
landfill. Clearly, the government officials or agency who proposed the landfill will
support its construction. Why, then, is this dispute, where opposing interests are at

1. Sandra M. Rennie, Kindling the Environmental ADR Flame: Use of Mediation and ArbitrationIn
FederalPlanning,Permitting,and Enforcement, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10479 (1989). "ADR is a catch-all
phrase for a variety of techniques and procedures used by third-party neutrals to help stakeholders in a
dispute find a basis for agreement." Id. at 10479. See infra text accompanying note 89.
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a stand-off, not best suited for a judicial resolution? The answer is that this
controversy, unlike many private suits, involves resolving "distributional disputes." 2
Most often, resolution of private civil disputes will hinge solely on the parties'
legal rights. Whether a tort or contract claim, the ultimate judgment will rest on
legal principles. In contrast, the construction of the landfill will involve much more
than legal rights. It will concern the greater issue of distributing a public need
among the citizenry. Proponents of the landfill will emphasize its necessity, while
those opposed will want it built at another location. If built elsewhere, the citizens
there will likely oppose its construction as well. As one can see, public disputes are
not solely win-lose situations. One party may not succeed to the total exclusion of
other interests. The underlying problem will not disappear at the conclusion of the
dispute-the problem must eventually be resolved. If the proponents of the landfill
lose a suit to their opponents blocking the landfill's construction, the same dispute
may arise later if the landfill is proposed in another location. Therefore, approaching
this dispute in the same manner as a private civil suit will not lead to an effective nor
permanent solution for many interested parties. Litigation will simply postpone a
final solution, and at great delay and cost to all concerned.3
A better solution to public disputes may be reached outside the realm of
traditional litigation. The parties must view their dispute not as a win-lose situation,
but instead as a dispute where all parties may gain if they work together.4 The
combatants must set aside their differences and work towards a cooperative solution.
"All-gain agreements can only be achieved when the parties stress the cooperative,
and not the competitive, aspects of their relationship.... This requires cooperation,
even in the face of competing self-interests. ' Instead of proceeding directly to
litigation, opposing parties in a public dispute may achieve better results if nontraditional dispute resolution processes are employed. 6 Specifically, unassisted
negotiation and assisted negotiation7 may provide more effective resolutions to
complex public disputes in shorter fashion, and at less cost.8
This Comment will explore various consensual approaches and their application
to public disputes. Specifically, unassisted and assisted negotiation will be examined
in detail.9 In addition, the specific application of consensual approaches will be
explored in the context of public environmental disputes.'0 Finally, the issue of

2. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL
APPROACHES To RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 17 (1987). Distributional disputes differ from private
suits which center primarily on the definition of legal rights. "Distributional disputes focus on the
allocation of funds, the setting of standards, or the siting of facilities (including how we use our land and

water)." Id.
3. See DOUGLAS J. AMY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 17-39 (1987).
4. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supranote 2, at 33-34.
5. Id.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 12-69.
7. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 2, at 11. Unassisted negotiation and assisted negotiation
are also referred to as "negotiated approaches to consensus building." Id.
8. AMY, supra note 3, at 17-39.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 12-69.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 70-112.
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alternative resolution to public disputes at the federal administrative level will be
examined. "

II. CONSENSUAL SOLUTIONS To PUBLIc DISPUTES
A. Overview
Litigating public disputes often leads to unsatisfactory results for all interested
parties. If one accepts this statement as true, the subsequent issue one faces concerns
possible alternatives to litigation. The first alternative involves the use of the
political process.' 2 Since what is at issue is of public concern, one would anticipate
that resolution through the established political regime would be a viable alternative.
Referenda, the voting process, and other political activities can resolve public
disputes, but they have a limited ability to resolve these disputes quickly and
efficiently. 3 Accordingly, parties should attempt to resolve their differences through
more informal processes.
The basic characteristics of informal approaches are important to understand
because they help explain why these dispute resolution processes better satisfy the
parties' interests. Specifically, five main characteristics of informal dispute
resolution processes should be present.' 4 First, the process should be ad hoc.' In
other words, the process should be flexible enough to allow the parties to fashion the
process to suit their particular needs. Second, the process should be informal,
meaning that the parties should deal with each other directly-not through hired
advocates.' 6 Third, the process should be consensual.' The parties must treat all
interests, including those of others, as important. Fourth, the dispute resolution
process should be conducted face-to-face. 8 Finally, as discussed above, informal
resolution of public disputes is most appropriate when the conflict is restricted to
distributional issues. 9
Utilizing informal processes to resolve public disputes under the guidelines set
out above will lead to "joint problem solving," and will avoid the adversarial
shortcomings of litigation. 20 This approach will foster better relations between the
parties, and lead to a more acceptable result for all involved.
The characteristics outlined above provide only a cursory overview of informal
means of solving public disputes. Within the realm of "negotiated approaches to

1I.See infra text accompanying notes 113-36.
12. See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 2, at 35-76.
13. Id. This Comment will not explore in detail the shortcomings of the political process in resolving
public disputes. In short, the political branches are not equipped to resolve public disputes quickly Or
efficiently. Id.
14. Id. at 76-79.
15. Id. at 77.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.See supra note 2.
20. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 2,at 77.
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consensus building" there exists more specific processes which may be divided
between unassisted negotiation and assisted negotiation.
B. UnassistedNegotiation
Defined broadly, unassisted negotiation occurs when parties involved in a public
dispute voluntarily agree to informally seek a resolution to their dispute without the
2
The parties seek to reach a consensus on a particular issue
aid of an intennediary.
that is agreeable to all. This "voluntary negotiation" often will better serve the needs
and interests of all concerned. "Consensus... is more likely to resolve a dispute
or a court
than a vote of a legislative body, a decision by an administrative agency,
22
decree because it is likely to meet more of [the parties'] interests."
Unassisted negotiation of public disputes is appropriate in only very limited
circumstances. This is because of the very nature of public disputes. Return to the
above example of the dispute surrounding the construction of a landfill. In this
scenario, numerous parties will have an interest in the outcome of the dispute. Also,
the dispute will involve many technical and scientific considerations beyond the
purview of the average citizen. It would be extremely difficult to informally gather
all interested parties and have those individuals resolve such a complex dispute. In
circumstances such as these, informal resolution requires the aid of a professional
intermediary.'
Not all public disputes involve countless parties and complex, technical facts.
In some instances, unassisted negotiation may produce excellent results. Three
preconditions have been identified in which unassisted negotiation may be
appropriate.24 First, the issues in dispute and the number of interested parties
involved should be "few in number and readily identifiable."" Second, the parties
must establish clear channels of communication to foster settlement. 26 Third, all
parties must believe that the uncertainty of litigation is sufficiently high in
comparison to settlement. When these factors are present, resort to unassisted
negotiation may be appropriate. Overall, the number of public disputes which satisfy
the above criteria is somewhat small. More often, the dispute has numerous issues
and various interests. Lines of communication are often unclear. Finally, parties
often are overconfident of the success of litigation. Nevertheless, when these criteria
are not all met, but the parties are willing to informally resolve the dispute, assisted
negotiation will be most appropriate.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See id. at 80-135.
Id. at 81.
See infra text accompanying notes 28-49.
See SUSSKuND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 2, at 133-35.
Id.at 133.
Id.
Id.
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C. Assisted Negotiation
Assisted negotiation involves the use of an independent intermediaryto aid in
resolution of the dispute.28 The process remains consensual, but employs outside aid
in helping promote understanding and settlement. 29
Certain characteristics warrant consideration of the use of assisted negotiation
in public policy disputes.3" First, complex issues beyond the understanding of a
normal judge or jury implicates the need for assisted negotiation.3 Second, the
presence of interests which may not be adequately addressed by traditional legal
remedies also will create a need for a non-judicial resolution to the dispute.32 In
addition, a party's desire for a quick and private settlement to a public dispute will
be better satisfied through assisted negotiation.33
Two main forms of assisted negotiation exist: facilitation and mediation. In
choosing which process is most appropriate, the parties must determine how much
assistance they will require in reaching a settlement. In other words, the key
question becomes: "How much assistance in managing the negotiation process are
[the parties] likely to require in order to reach a satisfactory conclusion?" 34 While
this may be a difficult question for the parties to answer, the final determination will
hinge on what degree of management of the process will be needed.35
Facilitation and mediation differ in regard to the degree of control over the
procedure which is given to the intermediary. 6 When more control is required, the
parties should choose the aid of a mediator. When less control is needed, a facilitator
will be more appropriate. An overview of both processes will make the distinction
clearer.37
Facilitation is the least complex form of assisted negotiation. 3" Facilitation
"focuses on getting the parties to understand the issues at stake and jointly find a
solution that meets their needs. '39 The facilitator's role is limited to ensuring that the
parties lines of communication are free and open - she is concerned with procedural,
not substantive matters. 40 "The facilitator focuses almost entirely upon process,
making sure meeting places and times are agreed upon, sees that meeting space is

28. See id. at 136-85.
29. Rennie, supranote 1. "When traditional mechanisms used to resolve conflict fail or are otherwise
unsatisfactory, a third party without a stake in the outcome may be involved to provide the needed
guidance, communication, and problem solving often necessary to deal with differing interests and
values." Id. at 10479.
30. See Bert P. Krages, Mediation as A Tool for the EnvironmentalAdvocate, 12 NAT. RESOURcES
& ENV'T 209 (1998).
31. Id. at 211.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 2, at 151.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Nancy Kubasek & Gary Silverman, EnvironmentalMediation, 26 Am.Bus. L.J. 533, 536 (1988).
Important to remember is that the facilitator or mediator will have no authority to force the parties to
reach an agreement, instead they act solely to promote communication between the parties. Id.
38. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 2, at 152.
39. Krages, supra note 30, at 210.
40. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 2, at 152.
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arranged appropriately, and ensures that notes and minutes of the meeting are
kept." 4 In other words, "[t]he role of the [facilitator] is to facilitate communication
and ensure that the parties understand each other."' 2
Most importantly, the facilitator should not interject her ideas into the dialogue
between the parties. Instead, the facilitator seeks to simply promote discussion and
understanding. 43 The facilitator's role may be defined as seeking to "foster an
environment conducive to joint problem solving." The facilitator's job is not to
fashion a remedy to the dispute, but to aid the parties in designing a solution which
fits their interests. "[F]acilitation is called for when the disputing parties need some
assistance, but want that help limited to focusing or moderating their discussions. '4S
Mediation, in contrast to facilitation, requires the intermediary to be more
involved with the substance of the dispute. The mediator retains control over
procedures like the facilitator, but increases her participation in fashioning a
settlement between the parties.46 "In evaluative mediation, the parties advocate their7
positions to the mediator who then offers an opinion of the merits of their cases.'
The mediator in this sense may be best described as a "knowledgeable neutral."'
The key function of the mediator is to help the parties resolve their dispute, "not by
imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception
of their relationship, 49
a perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions
toward one another.,
D. Selecting an Intermediary
Upon choosing to proceed with assisted negotiation, one of the most important
decisions which must be made by the parties to the dispute will be selecting the
facilitator(s) or mediator(s) who will oversee the settlement process. Locating the
services of an experienced and knowledgeable facilitator or mediator is an essential
step in the negotiation process.
Should the parties chose to elicit the aid of an intermediary, the parties must
chose an objective facilitator or mediator.50 "An objective [intermediary] has no
connection to any groups or organizations that favor a specific outcome... [and] has
the professional skills and experience necessary to bring a group of diverse people

41. Id.
42. Krages, supra note 30, at 210.
43. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supranote 2, at 152.
44. Id.
45. Id.at 162.
46. See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 2, at 162-65.
47. Krages, supra note 30, at 210.
48. See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 2, at 162-65.
49. Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 37, at536. Note that the final settlement should always be
reduced to a written agreement to increase the likelihood that participating parties will abide by their
agreement in the future. See also Lawrence Susskind, Multi-PartyPublic Policy Mediation: A Separate
Breed,DISp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1997, at 6. "Informally negotiated outcomes need to be transformed into
formal mechanisms that will bind the parties in credible ways." Id.
50. See Sandra VanAllen Baker & Richard Matwysher, Seven Steps to Achieving a Genuine Public
Consensus on an Emotional Issue: With Specific Examples of How Citizen's Task Forces Have
Sometimes Failed,5 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 410,412 (1998).
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to a consensus." 51 Thus, the intermediary must act purely as a neutral. Her failure
52
to do so will jeopardize the fairness of the negotiation process.
Furthermore, in complex public disputes, the facilitator or mediator must have
some knowledge about the issues of concern to the parties. 53 Otherwise, the
intermediary will spend too much time deciphering the background to the dispute,
and inadequate time aiding the parties to reach a settlement.
Accordingly, once the parties choose to proceed with assisted negotiation, the
decision of whom to retain as a facilitator or mediator will be very important. Often,
the intermediary will be the key factor in whether the parties reach a resolution to
their dispute.
Many organizations today provide the professional facilitation and mediation
services required to solve public disputes. Among these providers include the Policy
Consensus Initiative, the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, 5 and
RESOLVE, Inc. 6 In addition, many private attorneys engaged in full-time ADR
practice are listed in Martindale-Hubbell's Dispute Resolution Directory.
E. Who Should Be Involved in Resolving PublicDisputes?
Thus far this section has discussed how, and by whom public disputes may be
better resolved through consensual processes. A final consideration concerns who
should participate in the resolution of these disputes.57 As discussed earlier, in
complex public disputes interested parties may be numerous and, in some cases,
difficult to ascertain. In order to reach a satisfactory resolution, all those concerned
should have a voice in the process. Three main groups should be involved in the
resolution process of most public disputes: citizens, business interests, and public
officials.

51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Susskind, supra note 49. "Mediators of public policy disputes need to know something about the
substantive realm in which they are working, and be extremely sensitive to the larger context of their
work." Id.at 5.
(last modified Jan. 12, 2000) <http://www.agree.org>. Policy
54. PCI, Policy Consensus Initiative
Consensus Initiative ("PCI"), formed in 1997, works with state governments to develop and strengthen
consensus building and alternative dispute resolution programs within the framework of state
governments, PCI works with leaders in states to establish and strengthen consensus building and
conflict resolution as methods for enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of state government.
55. The University of Arizona, Udall Centerfor Studies inPublic Policy (visited May 11, 2000)
<http://udallcenter.arizona.edu/index.html>. The Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, located at
the University of Arizona, states as its mission to facilitate, analyze, and provide options for the solution
of major policy issues through research, education, and public service. Inaddition, the Udall Center
provides assistance in resolving public environmental disputes. See also U.S. Institute for
Environmental Conflict, U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict (visited May 11, 2000)
<http://www.ecr.gov>.
56. RESOLVE, Center for Environmental & Public Policy Dispute Resolution (visited May 11,2000)
<http://www.resolv.org>. RESOLVE, Inc. is a non-profit organization located in Washington, D.C.
which describes itself as a leader in mediating solutions to controversial problems and broadening the
techniques for consensus building on public policy issues. RESOLVE, Inc. provides mediation and
facilitation services in an effort to resolve public policy disputes.
57. See StJSSKIND & CRUtKSHANK, supra note 2, at 186-236.
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Clearly, citizens affected most by the public dispute must be involved in the
consensual process. Those who do participate "should reside in the community
which they represent and have a stake in the resolution of the issue.""8 A problem
arises in identifying and representing the diverse interests of a large citizenry.
Selecting an experienced facilitator or mediator will aid most in alleviating this
problem. 9 Skilled intermediaries will be have the requisite abilities to identify key
public interests and bring them to the bargaining table. 60
An additional concern in resolving public disputes is the perceived bargaining
power imbalance between private citizens and governmental and business interests. 6'
Again, the most appropriate way to deal with this dilemma is to secure the services
of an experienced and knowledgeable intermediary.62
A final concern relating to citizen involvement in assisted negotiation relates to
the level of involvement. In some circumstances, the number of affected individuals
in a public dispute may reach into the millions. In our hypothetical landfill dispute,
the number of concerned citizens could number in the thousands. Clearly, all
interested parties can not participate directly in the negotiation. Most commentators
believe that the intermediary must limit who participates to a manageable number. 63
But, "parties substantially affected by the negotiations must be included in the
negotiations."64
In appropriate circumstances, business interests, meaning parties with a direct
financial stake in the resolution of the dispute, should be involved in the negotiation
process. The most obvious justification for business involvement in public dispute
resolutions is the potential monetary implications on specific business interests. 65
Delays caused by litigation can result in increased costs to business interests
involved in the construction of public projects. By involving themselves in the
resolution of the dispute, business interests may expedite settlement and save
themselves money in the process.6
Finally, government officials should normally be involved in the resolution of
public policy disputes. "The pluses of government involvement are many.
Participation by government officials can play a vital role in legitimizing the
negotiation process for other participants.,, 67 Note that for government officials to
participate in a public negotiations, they must resolve to give away some power to

58. Baker & Matwysher, supra note 50, at 413.
59. See Raymond E. Tompkins, Mediation, the Mediator,and the Environment, 11 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T 27, 28-30 (1996).

60. See id.
61. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 2, at 210-13.
62. See id; Tompkins, supranote 59, at 28-30.
63. Rosemary O'Leary, EnvironmentalMediation: What Do We Know and How Do We Know It?,
in MEDIATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 17, 23-24 (J. Walton Blackburn
& Willa Marie Bruce eds., 1995). "The number of people involved in environmental mediation must
be limited. Limiting the size of an audience and extending specific invitations may increase the
likelihood that the desired people will participate." Id. at 24.
64. Id. at 23-24.
65. See AMY, supra note 3, at 20-21.
66. Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 37, at 540. "From a business perspective, delays in beginning
a project may result in increased costs when the project is finally completed." Id.
67. O'Leary, supra note 63, at 25.
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the citizenry and business interests. 68 Overall, government involvement in the
resolution process will increase the chances for long-term success. 69

III. CONSENSUAL RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC DISPUTES
A. Resolution of Environmental Disputes
As discussed in the preceding section, consensual resolution of public policy
disputes is often more advantageous than a protracted litigation. Through the use of
unassisted and assisted negotiation, parties may reach better solutions to issues of
public policy.
A wide array of public disputes may be better resolved through consensual
processes. For example, disputes concerning health care as well as low-income
housing may be resolved through alternative means. To date, consensual resolution
of public disputes has occurred with greatest frequency in the environment area."0
"[E]nvironmental mediation is now beyond the status of an experiment;
it is slowly
'
becoming a recognized alternative or a complement to litigation. M
Environmental disputes encompass many of the characteristics typically found
in other public disputes. Specifically, large numbers of interested parties are
concerned with the outcome of the dispute and the issues involved are of great public
importance. As addressed above, litigating disputes of this nature often results in a
substantial outlay of time and money, and often leads to unsatisfactory results for all
involved. Instead, many environmental disputes may be better resolved through the
consensual processes detailed in the previous section. 2
Furthermore, due to the complex nature of environmental disputes, the use of
an intermediary, meaning a facilitator or mediator, is almost assuredly necessary to
increase the chances of settlement. 3 Facilitation and mediation "enables the parties
to appreciate any flaws in their positions
and the merits of an agreed resolution as
7 4
a sensible alternative to litigation.
Four justifications arise for employing the use of a facilitator or mediator in
resolving environmental disputes. First, an intermediary will be able to identify
interested parties. 75 As will be addressed below, this will increase the chances of
settlement. Second, a facilitator or mediator will better explain the benefits and
disadvantages of a consensual process as compared to litigation.7

6

"[An]

environmental mediator must help the parties recognize some of the real costs they

68. Id. at 26.
69. See Susskind, supranote 49, at 5.
70. See MEDIATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (J. Walton Blackburn &
Willa Marie Bruce eds., 1995).
71. Kubasek & Silverman, supranote 37, at 539.
72. See Susskind, supra note 49; Tompkins, supra note 59. "[Mjediation is particularly appropriate
in those cases where the cost of litigation is expected to be great, the issues complex, the parties
numerous, [and] the stakes high ....
" Id. at 30.
73. Susskind, supra note 49, at 5.
74. Tompkins, supranote 59, at 30.
75. O'Leary, supra note 63, at 29.
76. See id.
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face if the matter is not resolved through [facilitation or mediation]." 7 Third, an
intermediary is crucial in resolving environmental disputes due to the ever present
concerns of inequality of information among the parties as well as inequality of
bargaining power. 7' An effective facilitator or mediator will address these concerns.
Fourth, an intermediary will help build trust among the parties, increasing the
chances for settlement. 9
B. Advantages and Disadvantagesof
Mediating EnvironmentalDisputes
"Environmental mediation has been used increasingly since the mid-1970's,
with varying degrees of support from business interests, environmentalists, and
government agency employees."'
The increase in the use of facilitation and
mediation to resolve environmental disputes may be attributed to a number of
factors.8
First, this increase may be attributable, to a large extent, to public dissatisfaction
with the ability of the federal judicial system to handle environmental disputes.8 2 "A
substantial number of the arguments in favor of mediation hinge on the inability of
our litigation system, as it presently functions, to handle environmental disputes in
a timely and cost-effective manner."83 The failure of the judicial system to resolve
environmental disputes in a timely fashion hurts all parties involved. Interest groups
opposed to a particular project may fimd it difficult to maintain support until the
completion of litigation.84 In addition, those charged with completion of an
environmental project, including governmental and business entities, may incur
substantial additional costs due to prolonged delay. 5
Second, consensual approaches to resolving environmental conflict are often
superior to litigation because of the lower cost of facilitation and mediation
compared to litigation. 6 Exact figures are difficult to estimate, but one author
conservatively estimated that, "Complex mediation cases could run into thousands
of dollars, but complex lawsuits could cost millions.'8 7
As mentioned above, another factor demonstrating the advantages of facilitation
and mediation over litigation in environmental disputes revolves around the litigation
process itself.88 "The courts are primarily designed to resolve private disputes

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 30.80. Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 37, at 535.
81. Seei. at 533.
82. Id. at 539.
83. Id. "The inability of the system to handle these cases efficiently stems in large part from the
increasing number of cases our federal courts are being forced to handle, resulting in increasing delays."
Id.
84. See ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS (Laura M. Lake ed., 1980).
85. See AMY, supra note 3, at 20-21.
86. See Kubasek & Silverman, supranote 37.
87. Id. at 541.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
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between two parties; environmental disputes often affect many parties." 9 Modem
rules of civil litigation generally envision a suit between two opposing interests.
Other parties may join the lawsuit as additional plaintiffs, but judges often are not
eager to permit many parties to join the case. Consensual processes, which are not
close-ended in nature, allow all major interests to have a voice in the resolution of
environmental disputes.9' Furthermore, "Having a greater number of parties at the
mediation table is... desirable because it maximizes benefits and minimizes costs
[because each] party is seeking a solution that gives the greatest gains to its interests
at the least cost." 91 Moreover, government involvement in the consensual process
increases the chances of settling environmental disputes. 92
Finally, many commentators contend consensual processes are preferable when
resolving environmental disputes because the use of an adversarial process such as
litigation is often counterproductive.93 Specifically, the adversarial process, which
often fosters hostility between the disputants, is troublesome in environmental94
disputes because, after the litigation ends, the parties must coexist peacefully.
"Conflicts are bound to occur in the future, and the negative feelings engendered by
the litigation process will make it more difficult for the parties to resolve future
disputes." 95 In addition, because facilitated or mediated solutions do not require a
winner or a loser like litigation, parties "are more likely to perceive the outcome as
fair, abide by the agreement, and mediate or negotiate future misunderstandings."'9
Despite the many benefits of resolving environmental disputes through
consensual processes, certain factors indicate that some environmental disputes may
be better resolved through litigation. 97 First, many environmental statutes are
purposefully designed not to be resolved quickly. "Many environmental statutes
expressly require elaborate procedural safeguards because speedy and final
resolution of environmental problems may not always be in society's best
interests."98
Second, many environmental statutes are drafted in such a way as to require an
affirmative decision which may prevent compromise. 99 "[S]ome environmental
disputes involve such highly charged issues and potentially devastating effects to
health and the environment that there is simply no room for compromise."' ° For

89. Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 37, at 541. See RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: READINGS, MATERIALS, AND NOTES 316-24 (2d ed. 1978).
90. Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 37, at 542.
91. Id. at 543 (quoting Lawrence Susskind & Connie P. Ozawa, Mediated Negotiation in the Public
Sector, 27 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 255, 266 (1983)).
92. Tompkins, supranote 59, at 30.
93. Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 37, at 544.
94. See id. at 545-46.
95. Id. at 546. "The contrary impact occurs as the result of mediation. Even when the parties do not
agree with each other and cannot resolve their problem, they often report an improvement in their ability
to communicate with the other disputants." Id. at 546 n.74.
96. Id. at 546.
97. See id. at 547-52.
98. Id. at 547. "For example, a decision to grant a permit that would require an irretrievable
conmaitment of natural resources should not be hastily made." Id. at 548 n.85. See David Schoenbrod,
Limits and Dangersof EnvironmentalMediation, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1453 (1983).
99. Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 37, at 547. See Schoenbrod, supra note 98, at 1468.
100. Tompkins, supranote 59, at 68.
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example, disputes over the enforcement of environmental statutes, where one is
either in compliance or violation of a statute, often require a "yes-no" decision.) °
A third problem which may arise in mediating environmental disputes concerns
uniformity of application. Unlike litigation where judges rely on judicial precedent
when establishing their decisions, facilitated or mediated outcomes are in no way
bound by previous decisions. Some commentators argue that the potential for
widely disparate outcomes is unfair.' °2
Parties who do not like certain [environmental] regulations may try to achieve
a mediated settlement whereby they avoid the direct application of the rule. There
is always the danger that [facilitation or] mediation will short-circuit the
administrative process established by Congress to protect the public interest.' 3
A fourth potential problem with mediating environmental disputes is the
possibility that not all interested parties may become involved in the resolution
process. Where all parties with authority to implement a settlement agreement are
present, the chances of reaching and implementing an agreement are substantial.' 4
But where "those with the authority to make settlements cannot be forced to the
bargaining table, the chances of success declines."' '
A fifth problem with mediating environmental disputes arises when an issue of
great significance needs resolution. Settlement reached through facilitation or
mediation will not establish judicial precedent. 1
In addition, a consensual
settlement is not subject to judicial review. 0 7 "Thus, [facilitation and mediation]
subjects the disputants to a process in which there08is no accountability. There is no
means to ensure that the settlement was proper."'
Furthermore, troubling issues of confidentiality may arise when environmental
issues affecting the public interest are resolved behind closed doors.) 9 "Some
sectors of the public, if not actually involved in the mediation process, may view
mediation as inconsistent with the cherished notion that matters affecting the public
should be discussed and resolved in the open."' 10

101. Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 37, at 547 n.87.
102. Id. at 548.
103. Id. at 549.
This argument should perhaps be limited to mediation of compliance disputes. It is...
argued that allowing a citizens' group to sue to seek enforcement of statutes such as the
Clean Water Act is unfair because it allows private citizens to determine which firms will
be prosecuted, and such decisions should be made by the EPA.
Id. at 548 n.93. See ENvIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS, supranote 84, at 17880.
104. Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 37, at 550. See GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL
DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE 104 (1986) (demonstrating that the participation of parties with
decision making authority increased success rate).
105. Kubasek & Silverman, supranote 37, at 550.
106. Schoenbrod, supra note 98, at 1457.
107. Id.
108. Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 37, at 552.
109. Tompkins, supra note 59. "One of the hallmarks of mediation is confidentiality, but this same
aspect of mediation that makes it an attractive alternative to costly litigation may clash with the idea of
public participation found in most environmental statutes and regulations." Id. at 68.
110. Id.
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A final concern with mediating environmental disputes involves a potential
imbalance of power. Some commentators believe that dispute resolution in the
environmental context may not serve environmental interests if too much influence
is placed in the hands of opposing interests."' The litigation process in some
instances may
protect the interests of environmentalists in ways consensual processes
2
may not. 11
Overall, this discussion reveals that many public policy disputes, especially
those concerning environmental issues, may be better resolved through consensual
means rather than through traditional litigation. For many public environmental
disputes, consensual processes may lead to better and more long-lasting results than
a judgment in a judicial proceeding may provide.

IV. CONSENSUAL APPROACHES AT THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL
A. Administrative Rulemaking and PublicDisputes
The preceding section presented disputes concerning the interpretation and
application of existing laws and regulations to public policy issues. For instance, the
above scenario of the disputed landfill would center around economic and social
policy issues, environmental concerns, as well as applicable federal and state laws.
In that scenario, consensual approaches to resolving the dispute, namely unassisted
and assisted negotiation, may be employed to great success.
Significant disputes, specifically in the environmental area, may arise over the
enactment of the laws themselves." 3 As discussed earlier, resolution of public
disputes may be sought through the political process." 4 "When a new environmental
law is introduced in Congress or the state legislatures, interest groups who expect to
be helped or hurt compete with one another to persuade or pressure the elected
representatives.... 5 Often, the political process will not provide adequate solutions
to the concerns of many interested individuals. *
Note that the enactment of legislation by the legislature does not end the law
making process. "The legislature endorses a fairly broad policy, then delegates to
an administrative agency the task of promulgating regulations that will carry [the
law] out.""16 In theory, the administrative agency is charged with implementing the

I ll. O'Leary, supra note 63.
The potential disadvantages of environmental mediation include (1) the possibility that the
cogenial atmosphere created by mediators serves to disarm and co-opt environmentalists;
(2) the possibility that superior political and economic resources create imbalances of
power that allow pro-development interests to extract unfair concessions from
environmentalists at the bargaining table; and (3) the possibility that the mediation process
itself tends to redefine environmental issues in a way that favors pro-development interests.
Id. at21.
112. See id.
113. See LAWRENCE S. BACOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 279-

322 (1984).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.

115. BACOW & WHEELER, supranote 113, at 279.

116. Id. at 279-80.
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legislative will. In practice, the administrative agency has broad power to implement
often comprehensive and ambiguous legislative intent.'" 7
By manipulating the substantive and procedural rules it adopts, the agency can
significantly strengthen or dilute the apparent impact of the law. As a consequence,
the same interest groups that lobbied hard during the bill-drafting stage are very
likely to remain involved in the administrative rulemaking process." 8
Unlike the public disputes examined above, where formal recourse was
available only through the court system, disputes at the administrative level are
governed by statutory law." 9
Federal administrative procedures are governed by the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA" or "Act")' 20 which "establishes uniform procedures for certain formal
actions such as rule making and adjudication by any federal administrative tribunal
or official."'' Much of the work at the administrative level is accomplished through
the rulemaking process. " "Rule making is an agency action that regulates the future
conduct of persons, through formulation and issuance of an agency statement (the
rUle) designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy."'" The rulemaking
process itself may lead to public policy disputes. 24 "In many environmental policy
decisions, conflicts between competing interest groups arise, and policy making is
often delayed, incomplete, or subject to lengthy litigation."' 25
Similar to the public environmental disputes discussed in the preceding section,
resolution of administrative disputes between interested parties may take long
periods of time. 26 It may be years before a final decision is rendered in an
administrative dispute which travels through the traditional administrative
adjudicative process. Again, better results to these disputes may be reached through
consensual means. "Because of. . . problems with the conventional [administrative]

117. See id.
118. Id. at 280.
119. See Clare M. Ryan, Regulatory Negotiation: Learning From Experience at the US.
Environmental ProtectionAgency, in MEDIATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE,
supra note 70, at 203-16. "The regulatory activities of a federal agency are governed by overarching
statutes that have been developed and approved by Congress." Id. at 204.
120. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
121. Ryan, supra note 119, at 205.
Three primary requirements for rule making are included in the Act: (1) Notice that rule
making is going to take place; (2) opportunity to participate; and (3) a concise general
statement of the basis and purpose for the rule. A major objective of the APA is to provide
an opportunity for all affected interests formally to submit comments on proposed rules.
The Act requires the agency to conduct information gathering and sharing activities...
and to hold hearings to obtain public comment prior to specific decision points.
Id.
122. Id. "Federal regulatory agencies rely heavily on rule making as a means of formulating policy
Id.at.....
204.
123. Id.
124. Dennis H. Esposito & Kristen W. Ulbrich, NegotiatedRulemaking in EnvironmentalLaw, R.I.
B.J., Apr. 1998, at 5. "Final [agency] regulations are... replete with uncertainty as they are vulnerable
to challenge in court. Litigation over agency rules further protracts the rulemaking process and can
significantly escalate costs of rulemaking for all parties involved." id. at 5.
125. Ryan, supra note 119, at 204.
126. Id. at 205. "[T]he process of developing and finalizing a rule takes several months, often years."
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process, federal agencies have been encouraged through legislation and Executive
Order to use alternative means to develop rules."' 27 Namely, the Negotiated
Rulemaking Procedures Act 2 " and similar state legislation 2 9 permits federal and
state administrative agencies to resolve disputes which arise through the rulemaking
process in non-adversarial ways.
B. The NegotiatedRulemaking Act
"The Negotiated Rulemaking Act establishes a framework for federal agencies
to use regulatory negotiation to develop proposed regulations and clarifies the
agencies' authority to use this consensual technique."'"3 The use of regulatory
negotiation, commonly referred to as "Reg-Neg," allows administrative agencies to
work cooperatively with interested parties in an attempt to reach a consensus
regarding proposed regulations. 3 '
During reg-neg, representatives of the agency and other interested parties
engage in face-to-face negotiations concerning the text of the proposed rule. The
parties work toward achieving a consensus on the rule, at which point the APA
notice and comment provisions take over.'32 The process often results in a regulation
more acceptable to all interests than traditional notice and comment rulemaking
would have produced.'33
As mentioned briefly above, many administrative disputes involve promulgation
of environmental regulations. In response, federal environmental agencies, namely
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), have incorporated consensual RegNeg procedures in their formal rulemaking processes.' The EPA has used Reg-Neg
in rulemaking under the Clean Air Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
35
Rodenticide Act, and various other environmental regulations to great success.
Negotiated rulemaking offers many advantages over traditional notice and
comment rulemaking. As detailed above, Reg-Neg often results in more satisfactory
results for the participants at less cost, and in shorter fashion. Commentators note
that negotiated rulemaking is more appropriate in certain circumstances than in
others.

127. Id.
128. Negotiated Rulemaking Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
129. Esposito & Ulbrich, supra note 124. "Based on the successful examples of negotiated

rulemaking at the federal level, state and local governments have adopted and implemented their own
variations of reg-neg." Id. at 5. This Comment focuses solely on federal administrative procedures.
130. Ryan, supra note 119, at 205.

131. Id. "The technique [Reg-Neg] is based on the assumption that it is possible to bring the affected
interest groups together to negotiate the text of a proposed rule. Ifthe negotiators achieve consensus,
the resulting rule is likely to be easier to implement and the possibility of litigation is reduced." Id.
132. Esposito & Ulbrich, supra note 124, at 5 (emphasis added).
133. Id. "[Tlhe fact that the key interests have been represented in the process and have signed off
on the final product significantly reduces the likelihood of opposition in the comment period or
subsequent litigation over the rule." Id. at 6 (citing Lawrence Susskind &Gerard McMahon, The Theory
and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J.ON REG. 133, 137 (1985)).

134. See Esposito &Ulbrich, supranote 124, at 7-8; Ryan, supra note 119, at 209-15.
135. Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice ofNegotiated Rulemaking,

3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 143-44 (1985).
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First, people must believe that the expected outcome for them is equal to or
better than that which could be achieved by pursuing other alternatives. There must
be a balance of power between the parties, including the agency, such that they are
interdependent and no one party can achieve its goals without the others. [Finally,]
[t]he number of participants should ... be limited.'36
When these conditions are present, Reg-Neg offers interested parties and
administrative agencies an alternative means of resolving administrative disputes.
Similar to unassisted and assisted negotiation, Reg-Neg, when employed in the
appropriate disputes, allows once polarized interests to reach a consensual settlement
to administrative disputes.

V. COMMENT
This Comment has demonstrated that in appropriate circumstances, consensual
settlement processes may be utilized to resolve public disputes with greater
effectiveness than traditional judicial and administrative adjudication. While the
appear infinite, the overall use of
advantages of resolving public disputes informally
37
these procedures has been somewhat limited.
In environmental disputes, the use of unassisted and assisted negotiation has
increased in recent years. 3 ' But the proliferation of public environmental disputes
coupled with the increased costs and delays of resolving these suits judicially
warrant an increased reliance on consensual processes to resolve these disputes.
play an increasingly
"While clearly not a panacea, environmental mediation should
39
important role in resolving.., environmental disputes.'
The impetus for resolving environmental disputes informally must come first
public. 4 0
from government officials, followed by business interests and the
Increased use of consensual processes in certain well-defined environmental disputes
will undoubtedly lead to more acceptable outcomes for all interested parties. 41
State and local governments should follow the lead set by the federal
42
government through its enactment of the Negotiated Rulemaking Procedures Act.
This legislation demonstrates the federal government's commitment to resolving
public administrative disputes informally. "Encouragement to use Reg-Neg as a rule
making process in federal agencies will undoubtedly continue, and perhaps
increase.' 43

136. Esposito & Ulbrich, supra note 124, at 6 (quoting Mark Pelesh, Regulations Under the Higher
Education Amendments of 1992: A Case Study in Negotiated Rulemaking, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
151, 156-57 (1994)).
1.37. See generally O'Leary, supra note 63.
138. See supra text accompanying note 80.
139. Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 37, at 552.
140. See Rennie, supra note 1. "One of the changes that has occurred during the past five years is
the dramatic increase in effective use of environmental ADR by large corporations." Id. at 10483.
141. See Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 37. "A careful review of the successes and failures of
environmental mediation reveals that, under a limited set of conditions, the use of environmental
mediation may be highly appropriate, while in other situations its use should be avoided." Id. at 552.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 130-36.
143. Ryan, supra note 119, at 215.
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Increased use of consensual processes such as negotiated rulemaking would be
advantageous within the federal system as well. To date, negotiated rulemaking has
been used most frequently by the EPA." Other agencies confronted with public
disputes should increase the number of suits resolved informally. "Other agencies
considering the use of Reg-Neg should view the benefits of the process as
encouragement to experiment with the technique and view the drawbacks as an
opportunity to4 anticipate and perhaps avoid some of the pitfalls EPA has
experienced.' 1

VI. CONCLUSION
In summation, federal, state, and local governments must resolve to increase
their use of consensual processes when confronted with public disputes. In turn,
public representatives and business interests opposing each other or the government
must voluntarily agree to settle more disputes informally.'46 By increasing the use
of consensual processes to resolve public disputes, "parties can find solutions to
problems that cannot be addressed by judicial remedies" and "can achieve results.
that would be difficult or impossible to obtain through adjudicatory processes.' 47
BRETT A. WILLIAMS

144. See id. "Although EPA has a conducted [sic] a relatively small number of Reg-Neg processes,
it has more experience using the technique that most other federal agencies." Id. at 215.
145. Id. at 216.
146. Kubasek & Silverman, supranote 37. "Because mediation generally is a voluntary process, and
obtains many of its benefits from that voluntary nature, it should never be forced on disputants." Id. at
552.
147. Krages, supranote 30, at 210.
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